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1 Introduction
Retrospective voting has been examined mainly 
through the models of economic voting; that is, deter-
mining whether, when, and how voters are influenced 
by socio- and individual-economic status (see, Lewis-
Beck & Paldam 2000, Markus 1988, Nannestad & 
Paldam 1994, Kinder & Kiewiet 1979, 1981). To 
assess economic fluctuations, voters must possess a 
certain level of knowledge and competence(see, Lau 
& Redlawsk 1997, Lupia 1998)1. Voters are assumed 
to own cues to understand economic conditions, such 
as business cycles, economic growth, employment, 
inflation, and social welfare, which are thought to 
inf luence on sanctions (e.g. Ferejohn 1986, Barro 
1973, Kramer 1971) or selections of an incumbent 
1 As the representatives of negative assertions, for example, see Delli Carpini & Keeter (1996), Converse (1964) are in the context of limited ratio-
nality and pitfully low knowledge, Achen & Bartels (2004) is based on voter’s randomized response for events, and Huber et al. (2012) points out 
the serious bias for the recent performance rather than the passed.
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government (e.g. Ashworth & Bueno de Mesquita 
2008, Fearon 1999)2. Hence, as Healy & Malhotra 
(2009, 387) stated that “ [t]he study of retrospective 
voting has mainly focused on economic conditions”, 
economic voting has been placed at the core of 
performance voting .
A recent study, however, has examined the situa-
tion in which voters simply responded to the present 
economic status or to a gap/congruence between the 
promises an incumbent makes and what she actually 
implements. Under the newly accepted assumption 
of voter responsiveness, which voters are deemed 
to have the capacity to make judgments the national 
economy and make decisions based on them (e.g. 
Ansolabehere et al. 2014, Woon 2012, Lau et al. 2014, 
Lewis-Beck et al. 2013), recent empirical research 
on retrospective voting seems to have shifted in its 
perspectives about what determines a voter’s retro-
spection as a broader sense. Is the economy still the 
main domain of retrospective voting? Which affects 
a voter’s decision more: the state of the economy per 
se or the consistency between policy commitments 
and economic status? Further, how does retrospec-
tive behavior incentivize politicians to realize better 
policy outcome and comply with policy commit-
ments? While the effects of economic itself have 
previously been sought, the notion of accountability 
voting is now highlighted to answer these ques-
tions (see, Ashworth 2012, Healy & Malhotra 2013, 
Hellwig 2012, Woon 2012).
Such interests naturally lead to the next ques-
tion: does economic voting or accountability voting 
predominate? As a substantial understanding of 
real voters implies, voters cannot be starkly divided 
into two dimensions–either voting simply for the 
economy or for accountability. A certain voter who 
deeply cares about business conditions may simply 
consider the presence of a macro economic boom 
itself, while those who work in the financial world 
may try to scrutinize the gap between the govern-
ment’s economic perspective and real economic 
values such as gross domestic products (GDP), infla-
tion, unemployment rate, industrial production index, 
and so on. If we are to analyze a population whose 
concerns about actual economic status, incumbent 
policy promises, and their consistency/inconsistency 
are diverse and not mutually exclusive, the nuanced 
transitions of voters in time-series should be an 
appropriate and fruitful subject for analysis.
This study focuses upon those who not only 
consider the economic climate, but also who closely 
examine the government’s economic performance 
in terms of kept/unkept promises (Manin et al. 
1999, Powell 2000). It defines such retrospection as 
accountability voting3. Further, voters whose voting 
behavior wavers between retrospective economic 
voting (economic voting) and retrospective account-
ability voting (accountability voting) will be referred 
to as nuanced voters. As mentioned in Healy & 
Malhotra (2009, 301), scholarship on polit ical 
behavior “is providing a more nuanced, realistic, and 
complete picture of how retrospective voting actually 
takes place,”–i.e., it is trying to outline retrospective 
behavior in an inclusive, multi-faceted way. Along 
these lines, this research takes illustrating nuanced 
voters as its study object, incorporating both aspects 
of economic voting and accountability voting.
To grasp the above, the need for two types of 
empirical analyses is suggested. First, a time-series 
transition of the nuanced voters should be captured4. 
2 For more detailed classification of theories and empirics of the selection-sanction model, see for example, Ashworth (2012, 184-186). Further, dis-
cussions combining retrospective and prospective voting exists (e.g. Fearon 1999). In this research, assuming that both are not starkly divided, the 
retrospection is solely and mainly dealt with.
3 The term, accountability voting, may seem to be inappropriate, since retrospective economic voting per se embraces accountability elements. Yet, 
when electoral accountability should be narrowly defined as the consistency between policy promise and implementation (Manin et al. 1999), eco-
nomic voting is not necessarily linked to electoral accountability. That is, even if economic voting functions, it does not immediately mean voters 
hold government accountable for her performance. In this sense, accountability should not be understood simply intrinsic in economic retrospec-
tive voting, but its effect in retrospection should be externally and separately estimated. To prove accountability aspect in retrospection, voters’ 
evaluations on electoral accountability based on government’s promise and performance should be separately analyzed. Thus, in this research, 
accountability voting is almost separately set from economic voting.
4 Against macro-level approach, in order to cope with ecological fallacy, “[i]ndividual-level election survey investigations (microstudies) are 
invaluable” (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2013, 368). Pursuit of the nuanced voters between economic/accountability voting and their transition, 
the micro-study is useful. However, firstly, the illustration of time-series nuanced change can be further well illustrated by the aggregated data. 
Secondly, about the Japan’s case adopted in this research, the individual data is collected since 1960’s though, questionnaires about economic 
conditions in surveys are not constant through each period, and one for political accountability is so confined to a few recent surveys. Thus, this 
research will be conducted with the aggregated data based on the cabinet approval rates.
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In a concrete sense, the degree to which electoral 
accountability versus simple economic voting 
prevails in retrospective voting changes over time:, 
thus, comparing the extent to which accountability 
versus the economy can explain the variance of 
change in public support must be examined. Second, 
whether transitions in relative dominance of account-
ability versus the economy experience dramatic 
switches from one status to another should be under-
stood. With a change in the electoral institution, for 
example, it can be theoretically deduced that struc-
tural shifts in voters’ evaluations of the real economy 
and their emphases on electoral accountability may 
occur (see, Anderson 2000).
For exploring the transition between economy and 
accountability in one shot, and further, the temporal 
transition of the nuanced gradation itself, the quasi-
experimental setting offered by Japan’s 1993-94 
electoral institutional reform can be expected to yield 
meaningful implications. That is, the author tries to 
explore whether the electoral institutional reform that 
was envisioned to change the party government’s 
accountability also led to a shift in voter retrospec-
tion. The structural change of electoral institutional 
reform is expected to bring about change in electoral 
accountability led by the ruling party. In Japan, a 
new electoral system was sought to remedy the series 
of political scandals and corruption that had resulted 
from the money-oriented politics during the Middle 
Member District (MMD) system until the early 1990s. 
With a sizable political realignment, the longtime 
rule of the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
ended in 1993, and the new coalition government 
passed electoral institutional reform. This reform was 
founded on the motivation to move away from pork-
barrel-based politics towards policy-based politics.
The newly instituted Single Member District 
and Proportional Representation (SMD/PR) system 
prompted voters to focus on policy aspects, and was 
adopted in 1993 and first implemented in the 1995 
election for the House of Representatives. Under 
the electoral institution of the SMD, there has been 
a strong tendency for politicians to focus little on 
specific policy areas (special interest/private goods), 
and rather to orient their concerns towards a broader 
policy sphere (including general interest/public 
goods) (Cox 2008, Cox & McCubbins 2001, Cox 
1997)5. This change by politicians toward general 
interest meant that Japanese legislators began to 
distribute their attention more evenly across broad 
policy areas such as diplomacy, defense, finance, 
cabinet and public administration, tax, environment 
and so on, which had tended to be disregarded during 
the MMD period (Fujimura 2012, Saito 2010, Hirano 
2006, Tatebayashi 2004). Given this change in policy 
emphasis by legislators, it has been theoretically and 
empirically argued that the legislators/parties/govern-
ment in Japan have become more policy-oriented and 
have tried to assimilate policy promises into policy 
implementation6. This change is thought to have 
motivated the shift in voting retrospection from the 
economybased to the accountability-based. It leads 
us to the question: have graded, critical and policy-
dimensional changes between economic and account-
ability retrospective voting manifested in Japan?
Focusing on Japanese politics, I will conduct an 
empirical study using two types of analysis to seek 
meaningful implications for nuanced retrospective 
voting. In the next section, a review of relevant litera-
ture is introduced. Drawing mainly from the selec-
tion-sanction models (Fearon 1999, Ashworth 2005, 
Ashworth & Mesquita 2006), voters are assumed to 
face a complicated situation in which sophisticated 
knowledge is required for accountability retrospec-
tion, but have an incentive to cut the cost to assess 
what constitutes a good government. Voter inertia 
readily promotes the possibility of economy-based 
retrospection, by which a ruling party offering 
economic strength would be continually reelected. 
Such economic voting could be changed, however, 
by the way legislators are chosen.
The theoretical argument is then reviewed in 
the context of data from Japan: a shift in economic/
accountability voting is expected, which can be an 
appropriate case with which to analyze the nuanced, 
critical and policydimensional transitions between 
5 Japan is not limited to the SMD system, but the PR system also exists. However, depending on the ratio of the margin of loss in a single mem-
ber district, losers can still win a seat through PR (“best-loser” rule). Thus, candidates in the SMD/PR system are strongly incentivized to fight 
against rivalries (Pekkanen et al. 2006). In this situation, the Japanese electoral system is characterized more by SMD properties than by PR ones, 
compared with Germany, for example.
6 As this background, institutional reform intended to alter voting patters from personal vote to party vote (Estévez-Abe 2008, Cox 1997, Carey & 
Shugart 1995). Aside from the fact that this change actually occurred or not, party label indeed come to be strengthened as discussed in later.
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economic/accountability voting. In the third section, 
research design of variable settings and a strategy 
for estimations are introduced. In the fourth section, 
empirical studies are conducted with estimations 
of the impulse-response function computed by a 
Bayesian structural vector autoregressive (B-SVAR) 
model and historical decomposition (HDC). In the 
last section, discussions and conclusions that linken 
the estimation results into the context of Japan will 
be reviewed. Specifically, in regard to the analysis 
of public works spending as an index of the private 
goods sphere, the nuanced t ransit ion between 
economic and accountability voting is confirmed. 
Before the 1993-94 electoral reform, economic voting 
predominated over accountability voting, whereas 
after reform, election accountability became accen-
tuated. On the other hand, in regard to government 
expenditure and GDP, which has been considered 
to represent the public goods sphere, accountability 
voting has prevailed through all periods.
2 Why Should the Nuanced Voter be 
Emphasized: The Case of Japan
2.1  What economic and accountability voting 
bring about
In the literature, many theoretical and empirical 
studies have attempted to connect retrospective 
voting and electoral accountability in a narrow sense. 
It has been strongly postulated that economic voting 
is in some sense a variety of democratic account-
ability, because citizens sanction or reward a govern-
ment through economic performance (Anderson 
2007, Ferejohn 1986). However, recent studies have 
tried to extract the essence of accountability and its 
direct influence on retrospective voting (Ashworth 
2012, Healy & Malhotra 2013, Woon 2012, Hellwig 
2012). Relevant studies have tackled accountability 
with ingenious research designs, and include: studies 
that regarded accountability as a kind of evalua-
tion of government sincerity/ honesty with regard to 
promises to emphasize public or private goods and 
then analyzed its influence on retrospective behavior 
(Healy & Malhotra 2009, Chen 2013); an analysis of 
the effect of school board transparency on electoral 
outcomes (Berry & Howell 2007); and an exami-
nation of the relationship between the severity of 
judges’ sentences and their election results (Gordon 
et al. 2007), and an analysis of the influence of policy 
adjustment to voters’ policy positions on electoral 
performance (Hellwig 2012) .
Considering the literature trying to directly 
assess the effect of electoral accountability on retro-
spective voting, what is notable is the assumption that 
citizens have the competence to evaluate not merely 
socioeconomic conditions, but the origins of them–
i.e., electoral promises for social economic policy. 
Regarding retrospective behavior, a long-running 
dialogue has been held over voters’ rationality 
and responsiveness (see, Lewis-Beck et al. 2013, 
Anderson 2007). Although recent studies assume 
enough citizen competence to understand the state of 
economy either in a sociotropic or pocketbook way, 
disputes persist over the extent to which voters can 
connect policy outcomes with party policy promises, 
policy formulations, and government competence 
(Lewis-Beck et al. 2013, Duch & Stevenson 2013).
In order to understand voters’ information-
processing, the selection and sanction models specifi-
cally offer an important implication (Fearon 1999, 
Ashworth 2005, Ashworth & Mesquita 2006): voters 
reckon the performance of a government’s economic 
stewardship after an election, based on a certain 
level of policy information to assess the consistency 
between what government previously appealed and 
what it presently implements. To judge this consis-
tency, voters need a more sophisticated rationality 
than simply considering the economic climate and 
their personal economic status per se (Alt et al. 2014, 
Woon 2012, Healy & Malhotra 2013). Here, even 
using the heuristic to understand the complex macro 
financial economics or individual economic status, 
voters must treat information not only based on their 
intuitive knowledge of economic status, but on their 
scrutiny of government’s sincerity. Thus, at least 
the selection-sanction model seems to imply that 
some voters hold considerably higher knowledge and 
understanding (Alt et al. 2014, Ansolabehere et al. 
2014, Woon 2012).
From the selection-sanction theory, contrast-
ingly, another critical implication can be drawn: 
rational voters are incentivized to reselect or punish 
an incumbent to diminish costs for scrutiny of policy 
information (e.g. Huber et al. 2012, Besley 2007). 
Given voters desire enhancement of welfare in 
general, if they believe a single ruling party/govern-
ment to continuously supply it, they will regularly 
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re-elect a good government that benefits them. Under 
these conditions, voters are presumed to overlook 
economic performance vis a vis previous elec-
toral promises and economic voting with constant 
welfare benefits is predicted to take precedence over 
accountability voting with heavy considerations 
on policy promises . Moreover, in such a situation, 
voters are assumed to pay their attentions on the 
targeted private goods rather than public ones (see, 
Cox & McCubbins 2001). Voters entertaining the 
targeted private goods are expected to continually 
select economically-good government (see, Stokes 
1999, 2005, Scheiner 2008). In other words, repeated 
reelect ion of  economically-good  government 
inversely implies that the chance for a opposition 
party whose capabilities are unknown to be selected 
is diminished during that time (Scheiner 2006). As 
long-time rule and watereddown opposition parties 
continue, economic voting is predicted to be held to 
gradually predominate over accountability voting.
A certain structural change, however, guides 
nuanced voters away from economic-centered voting 
toward accountability-centered voting, causing 
change in the ruling party, government. When insti-
tutional changes foster voters’ attention on policy 
per se, citizens are motivated to check the congru-
ence among electoral policy promises before an 
election, policy formulation after the election, and 
policy outcomes. In sum, a certain type of electoral 
institutional change aiming to transform electoral 
accountability can foster retrospective voting as a 
manifestation of policy responsiveness, not merely of 
government economic performance7.
To this end, the most inf luential alteration is 
thought to be the electoral institutional change from 
a system in which multiple candidates are selected 
from one district into a small member-district (SMD) 
system (Bonoli 2001, Anderson 2000, Cox 2008)8. 
Under an SMD system, at each district level, voters 
can readily reselect (replace) a good incumbent (a bad 
incumbent) with whom they judge to be competent. 
On a national level, voters can readily evaluate ruling 
party performance because there are fewer options in 
an SMD (Taagepera & Shugart 1993), in which the 
value of a party label is relatively stronger and a two-
party system is fostered. This change is presumed to 
lead a shift in voter attention on party policy, since 
policy package is embedded into a partisanship that 
focuses on few options. As the change of legislators/
candidates, they must cover the broader policy area. 
Also, as each district is limited to one or two potent 
candidate, policy coverage must be expanded and this 
transition should create an emphasis on policy and an 
increase in policy information for voters. Thus, SMD 
should promote to function electoral accountability, 
and with this electoral system, accountability voting 
should be promoted.
In sum, whilst retrospective voting under an 
electoral institution allowing multiple winners is 
predicted to lean toward economic voting, an insti-
tution that allows for only one winner promotes 
accountability voting. Gradual wavering between 
economic and accountability voting should emerge 
through time. However, in order to analyze the 
transitions of nuanced voters’ priorities which are 
theoretically and empirically expected, what kinds of 
cases and methods should be employed?
2.2  What the case of Japan reveals: Electoral 
institutions as the context
Retrospective voting closely links to how the govern-
ment to be selected. Which party voters retrospec-
tively select is inextricably associated with which 
party is chosen as the ruling party or punished to go 
into the opposition. The case of Japan, in which the 
long-time rule by the LDP had lasted, but in turn, 
power shift has been seen with some frequency, 
implies that the pattern of voters’ retrospection is 
likely to have changed. How can this change be 
examined vis a vis the axis of economic/account-
ability voting? And what implications does the Japa-
nese nuanced voters to retrospective voting studies 
in general?
Japanese politics have been long understood along 
the axes of special interests vs. general interests, 
or private goods vs. public goods (e.g. Ramseyer & 
Rosenbluth 1997, Pekkanen et al. 2006) 9. During 
7 Research dealing with the direct link among retrospective voting, electoral institution and political knowledge seems to have been limited. The 
seminal exceptions are such as Duch & Stevenson (2008) and Powell & Whitten (1993), but in them, the path in which electoral institution deter-
mines the degree of policy information, and finally influences retrospection, has not been studied yet.
8 As the literature claiming the limitation of political institutions, see Hobolt et al. (2013).
9 For the notion and theoretical basis of public goods/private goods-axis, see Cox (2009), Cox & McCubbins (2001), Barro (1973).
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the 38 years of Liberal Democratic Party dominance 
under the so-cal led 1955 System, the MMD 
system continued to bring electoral incentives that 
delivered pork to voters seeking targeted interests 
(e.g. McCubbins & Rosenbluth 1995). A political 
candidate can win with less votes, since multi-
candidates from one party and one electoral district 
can be elected under the MMD system. This situation 
meant that Japanese legislators specialized in specific 
policy interests that would readily yield pork in such 
areas as construction, agriculture, transportation, 
commerce and trade, budget, and posts 10. In this 
sense, the 1955 system and the MMD era can be 
rephrased as the political era of special interests and 
private goods. The MMD system kept politicians 
incentivized to deliver pork, inescapably encouraging 
money politics and thus evoking the necessity for 
institutional change.
Recognizing the need for reform, the four political 
reform-related bills [Seiji Kaikaku Yon Hou] were 
passed in 1993 and came into effect in 1994. Under 
the newly adopted SMD/PR system, the most char-
acteristic change was that electoral incentives for 
politicians shifted to cover a broader policy area. 
Under the SMD system in which only one candidate 
can be elected, each candidate is also expected to 
include in their platform previously unpopular policy 
areas of public goods. Recalling the tenet of Healy 
& Malhotra (2009, 389), when a government is rich 
in accountability, it should stress policies related to 
the formation of public goods rather than targeted 
private goods. Weighed against this classification, 
electoral accountability was considered to shift after 
the electoral reform in Japanese politics through the 
change from stressing private goods to including 
public ones. As politicians/ruling parties/government 
accentuate policy (promise), voters are naturally led 
to obtain more policy information. Founded on these 
logics, in the case of Japan, how was this change 
brought about? Further, how does it relate to retro-
spective voting?11
The policy area for private goods and special 
interests such as construction, t ranspor tation, 
commerce, industry, etc. is closely related to the 
business climate (Kohno & Nishizawa 1990, as in 
the Japanese context, see,). As the political business 
cycle theory suggests, the government’s legitimacy 
is threatened if there is a downturn in the economy 
(see, Iversen & Soskice 2006). Thus, the govern-
ment, which is acutely aware that voters observe and 
take into account economic conditions in electoral 
decisions, tries to create an economic boom before 
an election. The government ensures an increase 
in public works projects to reduce unemployment, 
sacrificing inflation to an extent. In the context of 
Japan, public works have been thought of as a func-
tional equivalent of social welfare, which is the core 
of targeted private goods (Estévez-Abe 2008). Public 
construction generates employment not only in the 
construction industry, but also in transportation 
companies that haul building materials, mid-sized 
producers of building materials, and so on. Coupled 
with electoral incentives toward influence peddling, 
this kind of special interest/private goods politics 
seemed to pressure voters toward retrospective 
economic voting through attention on the economic 
climate under the MMD system led by the LDP12.
Consequently, from the perspective of voters, 
the motivations for economic voting are ascendant 
under the MMD system. The implication is that the 
LDP’s long-time rule fostered voter reluctance to 
select a challenger whose governance capabilities are 
unknown (Scheiner 2006). The scrutiny required of 
policy responsiveness–i.e., electoral accountability–
is relatively costly, with high burden placed on 
voters compared with simply judging the economy. 
10 As a brief review, see Scheiner (2008, 163-164). The detailed explanations are in Estévez-Abe (2008), Fujimura (2012), Fujimura (2013), Hirano 
(2006), McCubbins & Rosenbluth (1995), Ramseyer & Rosenbluth (1997), Saito (2010), Tatebayashi (2004). As the related perspective, special 
interest lobbyists [Zoku-giin] reigned supreme in LDP politics through strong ties with bureaucrats of the relevant ministries, fostered in policy 
deliberation committees and individual committees. Although specialinterest lobbyists naturally survived after reform, the incentives to be as-
signed to a particular committee for distributive politics is likely to gradually decline. 
11 In Japan, studies on legislative politics, which focuses on the distribution politics between public and private goods are abundant, as reviewed in 
this section. Against this, it is a bit limited the research as to how voters perceive and evaluate distribution of goods, how the electoral institution-
al change influences on voters’ perceptions and behaviors, and how voters’ evaluations on electoral accountability has changed. Although mainly 
aiming to draw the general implication of retrospective voting, this research also pursues to explain the effect of electoral institutional change on 
Japanese electorate.
12 As another topic, we must consider not only whether voters observe and can rationally judge government competence, but whether they can be 
conscious about how the government controls business cycles. In this paper, these questions will not be directly dealt with; however, voter capac-
ity to act based on higher-level policy information should be carefully analyzed in future work.
116
Journal  of  Policy  Studies   No.57  (September  2018)
Under the MMD system with its many profits and 
limited policy information, those who were intensely 
concerned with matters of personal profit and gain 
did not take the opportunity to carefully check the 
government’s policy responsiveness13.
After electoral reform, however, Japanese retro-
spective voting supposedly inclined more toward 
accountability voting. As mentioned previously, legis-
lators began to move toward a broader policy area 
and devote more attention to policy-based behavior 
rather than special-interest-based (Fujimura 2012, 
2013, Hirano 2006, Scheiner 2008). Although previ-
ously not well-confirmed in literature without a few 
exception, legislators’ emphasis on policy is thought 
to influence the Japanese electorate’s attitudes and 
behaviors. Before reform, the division of limited 
resources was of highest interest, not the policy itself. 
After reform, with the presumed increase in voter-
policy interest, the electorate is assumed to care 
more about how well policy promises match policy 
outcomes14. Providing a collateral evidence, Nyblade 
(2011) proposes the notion of hyper-accountability 
(see also, Roberts 2008). Japanese voters are recently 
apt to demand more electoral accountability in both 
qualitative (requiring more sincerity) and quantita-
tive (requiring more frequency) terms. This change is 
thought to indicate that power shifts occur frequently. 
The direct evidence of rising accountability voting 
is limited, but as the hyper-accountability argument 
suggests, accountability voting is likely to predomi-
nate following the institutional change to the SMD-
dominated system.
In the context of Japanese electoral politics, 
hence, the relative dominance of economic versus 
accountability voting should be observable. And 
electoral institutional change likely to transform the 
relative weight of Japanese nuanced voters’ reflec-
tions. The predicted change can be put simply as: 
before electoral institutional reform, economic 
voting was dominant, while after reform, account-
ability voting was.
Fur ther, depending on whether the policy 
sphere is public or private, the proportion of both 
economic and accountability ought to differ. As 
recent studies have shown, if the government is suffi-
ciently accountable, it weighs heavily on policies 
related to the public sphere (Healy &Malhotra 2009). 
According to Healy & Malhotra (2009), when the 
government is good (sincere) enough to supply public 
goods, electoral accountability is emphasized15. From 
this understanding, the implication can be deduced 
that the spending respective to public goods sphere 
can foster accountability voting rather than economic 
voting. Against this expectation, in the private policy 
sphere, voters look to targeted goods and value 
benefits that immediately surround them. Thus, in 
the case of rising profits and voters’ attentions on 
the direct interests in the private goods sphere, we 
can predict a prevalence of economic voting. Again, 
nuanced voters wavering between economic and 
accountability voting should show different trends in 
the context of private versus public spheres.
Along these lines, the Japan’s case is expected to 
offer the nuanced, critical and policy-dimensional 
changes in voters’ retrospection between economic/
accountability voting. In order to examine two main 
tasks: (i) the graded change, (ii) before and after the 
electoral reform, and (iii) private versus public goods 
contrast: the research design including measurement 
of electoral accountability and methods for estima-
tions will be explained in the next section.
3 Research Design
3.1  Measuring Accountability
In empirical analyses, how government approval 
ratings respond to the real economy and account-
ability will be estimated. Time-series approval 
ratings data is required to perform longitudinal 
13 As a further emphatic argument, the relationship between Japanese voters and government was typified by perverse accountability, in which vot-
ers were paradoxically held accountable to the ruling party in order to receive more resources (see, Saito 2010).
14 Although it is not directly related to the retrospective voting, the unity within each party and the power of party leaders are thought to be strength-
ened after reform (e.g., Cox et al. 1999).Leaders in the ruling party have still held stronger power in the allocation of posts, interests, and cam-
paign resources than before the change. Although legislators began to care more about broader policy areas, including general interests, the policy 
deliberation committees relating to special interests have been popular (Fujimura 2012). In order to be assigned to such committees, the degree 
to which the backbenchers obey party leadership increases and party discipline has been gradually enhanced. With this change, in appealing to 
party leadership, legislators try to be well versed in many policy areas. 
15 In Healy & Malhotra (2009), private goods are set as the procurements for natural disasters, while public goods are defined as preparedness for 
them.
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analyses. Monthly data of the cabinet’s approval 
rating is collected by the Jiji-Press (JP: Jiji Tsuushin-
sha), and is widely employed as the most reliable 
and longest-running dataset of the topic. Thus, the 
following analysis will basically adopt JP’s approval 
data. According to explain later in this section, data 
consists of periods from the second quarter (April-
June) of 1981 to the second quarter of 2013, and the 
full numbers of samples are 133.
Since, in this research, accountability is defined 
based on responsiveness (Manin et al. 1999, 40-46), 
economic gain does not always mean strengthened 
government support, because both economic and 
accountability voting aspects factor into support 
levels. In Besley (2007, Chap. 3), for example, 
accountability is set as the growth of economic 
performance such as (state) income growth and 
tax increases in the context of a U.S. gubernatorial 
election16. Such a measurement has the power of 
simplicity because it can directly capture an incum-
bent’s ability to bring about economic growth or 
decline. This type of definition, however, seems to 
have two problems. Firstly, variables representing the 
growth of economic performance cannot distinguish 
pure economic effects ones from accountability 
component reflected in economic condition; however, 
the setting presumes economic growth and decline 
entirely reflect an economic cause. The consequence 
of accountability is resultingly measured as the 
economic outcome. If at all, economic outcomes 
referring to pure economic status and ones including 
accountability aspects must not be mixtured, and 
separately operationaized. Secondly, this measure-
ment does not incorporate the core of accountability: 
that is, what a ruling party or government promises. 
For any measurement of accountability, the most 
important aspect is to substantially reflect a govern-
ment’s promise or prospects.
Along this sense, whether a government carries 
out a better policy with words or without words 
should be separated in the measurement of account-
ability. Taxonomically, a given electoral situation can 
be divided into four patterns according to the “talk 
the talk vs. don’t talk the talk” and “walk the walk 
and don’t walk the walk” axes (as in Table 1). When 
the government sets a higher numerical goal, it must 
be punished if it fails and rewarded if it succeeds. 
Meanwhile, when a government opts for subdued 
language or does not make any proposals, its respon-
siveness should be differently assessed. From the 
perspective of the distinction between economic and 
accountability voting, “don’t talk the talk” is synony-
mous with economic voting: voters select an incum-
bent based only on economic performance, not on 
future promises. The incumbent is thus reinforced to 
“don’t talk the talk” through repeated past elections, 
as she knows that “don’t talk the talk” brings the 
better (or least worst) outcome. When the incumbent 
declines to firmly commit to a concrete numerical 
goal and the economy spontaneously improves, she 
is expected to garner public support with the boom, 
a similar positive evaluation to “talk the talk”. In 
“talk the talk but don’t walk the walk”, politicians 
can lose points with voters by speaking ambiguously 
or without making firmly commitments (Alesina & 
Cukierman 1987). Politicians can avoid the worst 
case if they meet “don’t talk the talk and don’t want 
the walk”, under which they are responsible only for 
their own mismanagement in actual economic condi-
tions, not for economic policies that they have prom-
ised.
In order to compare overarching patterns for this 
analysis, one of the desirable method is to divide all 
samples (periods) into these four types and compare 
the extent to which economic conditions influence 
f luctuations of the government’s approval. Based 
on whether a government mentions a concrete 
numerical economic goal, cases can be also classi-
fied by the level of success. If economic conditions 
affect approval rates in the case of “talk the talk” 
16 Besley (2007, 122-123) accountability is defined as the congruence/deviation between governors’ and voters’ ideology. The higher the degree of 
congruence is, the better the electoral performance is realized. While the definition of accountability in Besley (2007) is based on the consistency 
between citizen and government, the definition herein focuses the one between policy promises and policy implementation. Difference in the un-
derstanding of responsiveness is reflected to the variation of operationalization.
Table 1: Patterns of Economic Voting 
and Accountability Voting
talk the talk 
(accountability-
oriented)
don’t talk the talk 
(economy-oriented)
walk the walk 
(good economy) best result good result
don’t walk 
the walk (bad 
economy)
worst result worse result
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with respect to “don’t talk the talk”17, it implies that 
economic voting is far more influential than account-
ability voting in retrospective voting. In contrast, if 
the influence of economic status is diminished in the 
case of “talk the talk,” an electorate is likely to be 
influenced not just by the economy but by what the 
government has said.
However, despite the significance of a quasi-
experimental setting with the abovementioned case 
comparison, such a deterministic classification of 
cases–whether or not an incumbent makes a concrete 
promise–is not suitable for the sequential transition 
of a gradated picture in retrospective voting. In addi-
tion, whether, what, and how an incumbent commits 
to an economic policy is also hard to identify. Using 
for example manifesto data to identify a party’s 
policy promises does not guarantee that a concrete 
numerical goal is set. While it is not impossible to 
extract qualitative data from the wording of mani-
festos, it is difficult to assume that the tone in every 
election year is the same, and even more difficult to 
interpolate the data for non-election years. In fact, 
according to the theory that an incumbent party may 
intentionally retain ambiguous wording or a lack 
of commitment to promise key economic policy, 
economic policy promises, which are necessary to 
measure deviation from actual achievements, may 
not be even observable. In sum, if we rely on mani-
festo data sorted by election year, due to the unal-
terable and non-annual characteristics of electoral 
manifestos, the only available valid methodology is 
a deterministic case comparison between whether an 
incumbent states a concrete promise or not.
Gauging the nuanced transition of the nuanced 
voters, a sequential measurement that captures the 
movement of an electorate’s emphasis on economy 
versus accountability, would be ideal. To operation-
alize the aspect of electoral accountability as the 
gap between what an incumbent says and what she 
might do, the author focuses on the annually reported 
values from the economic prospects and the basic 
stance (EPBS) [Keizai Mitoshi to Keizai Seisaku ni 
taisuru Kihonteki Taido] for economic and fiscal 
management published by the Cabinet Office of 
the Government of Japan 18. The EPBS is annu-
ally approved in a Cabinet meeting. In the EPBS, 
prospects of the increase and decrease of economic 
indexes are stated. These indexes include GDP, 
government expenditures (including the govern-
ment’s final consumption expenditures and govern-
ment fixed-capital formation), contribution ratio of 
domestic demand, national income, unemployment 
rate, industrial production index, consumer price 
index, and the balance of payments. Characterized 
more as forecasts than as promises, the economic 
prospects are approved by the government with the 
government’s basic stance for economic and fiscal 
policy that reflects its engagements. According to the 
two-edged properties of the EPBS, we can gauge the 
government’s will for the economic front from the 
numerical targets that appear in the indexes.
Consistent with the def init ion of electoral 
accountability in this paper, the degree of account-
ability to be measured is the deviation from what 
the government says and what government realizes. 
Thus, the accountability is simply set as:
The degree of accountability
=[economic indicator: realized values]-[economic 
indicator: prospected values in the EPBS].
If the degree of accountability is positive (suffi-
ciently large), it means accountability is met (sufficiently 
met). In contrast, if its value is negative (consider-
ably small), it implies that accountability is not met 
(insufficient). In this paper, the economic indicators 
used are percentage changes from previous periods 
of GDP19, government expenditure as a whole20, and 
public investment (which is almost equal to govern-
ment fixed-capital formation)21. Spending on public 
works has been considered the functional equiva-
lent of social welfare in Japan’s welfare politics 
17 For example, the option for an estimation is through analysis with interaction terms between whether a government has made a promise and how 
successfully it is implemented.
18 Available at http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai1/mitoshi/mitoshi.html. Data before 1990, the raw document of EPBS can be accessed at National Ar-
chives of Japan. In EPBS, the actual measured percentage (of the first and second preceding years) and the prospected percentage of key economic 
indicators are reported. Reports include items of GDP, government expenditure, publicsector fixed-capital formation, imports and exports, contri-
bution ratio of domestic demand and foreign demand, national income, employment/unemployment, industrial production index, consumer price 
index.
19 Data is originally from “national economic estimates”, Cabinet office, Japan.
20 Government expenditure data refers to the values in EPBS.
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(Estévez-Abe 2008, Kitayama 2003, Miura 2012). In 
the form of employment for public works, the Japa-
nese government offers targeted private goods for 
voters.22. Changes in public-works spending refer 
to how much voters receive direct targeted private 
goods. As in the public goods spheres, government 
expenditures and GDP are set with public works in 
mind. Since government expenditures embrace the 
private goods sphere such as social spending and 
GDP, they are composed of mixed components from 
both public and private spheres, and measurements 
based on these two indicators should capture the 
broad picture. However, still this measurement is 
expected to mainly embrace public goods domain.
The length of variables is as follows: observed 
values of the GDP are quarterly; observed values 
of government expenditure, public investment, and 
proposed values are annual; and cabinet approval 
rating is monthly. Thus, in this study, the unit of 
analysis is unified as quarterly, because the most 
disaggregated economic indicator is the percentage 
change of the GDP, public-sector f ixed capital 
formation and government expenditures’ realized 
values. Corresponding to the realized values, the 
prospected EPBS values are divided by four. Taking 
public investments as a numerical example, in the 
first quarter of 2000, the percentage change from 
the previous quarter (the fourth quarter of 1999) was 
recorded as -6.6%. But, the proposed annual rate 
for 2000 (the percentage change from the previous 
year, 1999) in the EPBS was +0.9%. As this study 
cannot directly compare the quarter-realized value 
and annual prospected value, the annual value of 0.9 
is divided by 4, and +0.225% is set as the prospected 
quarter-value for the first quarter of 2000, assuming 
the quarter-value is supposed to be achieved four 
times on an annually adjusted basis. Hence, the 
degree of accountability [economic indicator: real-
ized values]-[economic indicator: prospected values 
in the EPBS] equals -6.6-0.225, or -6.825 points. As 
for cabinet approval, the mean values of four months 
is used. Approval rates from January, February, and 
March were 39.9, 35.4, and 32.4, respectively: thus, 
the mean value for the first period is set as 35.9%. 
According to these measurements, samples for the 
first quarter of 2000 are shown in Table 2.
3.2  The Strategy for Estimations: Grasp the 
nuanced transition with B-SVAR and 
Historical Decomposition
A retrospective mechanism is characterized with 
endogenous complexity in politico-economic status. 
A rise in the economy may promote or decrease 
government accountability, since the government 
is incentivized bidirectionally: obeying promises 
to further boost approval ratings, and breaking 
promises to maintain fiscal discipline. To that end, 
the effect of accountability on approval rating is 
determined. Although it can be intuitively assumed 
that an increase in accountability should enhance 
cabinet approval rate, the congruence of promise 
21 Data can be found in EPBS. Ideally, from the perspectives of what voters expect and what they are given, how much the government promises 
for expenditures is considered social welfare. While the government’s final consumption includes some social expenditures, pension and public 
livelihood assistance are calculated in consumer spending and finally integrated into social expenditures. In the EPBS, the government’s final 
consumption is reported, but it is not equivalent to social expenditure. Thus, due to limitations in measuring the government’s prospects for social 
welfare, this analysis cannot directly measure social welfare per se. Further, regarding GDP, what we must carefully consider is that GDP cannot 
be directly decided or manipulated by the government. The realized value of the GDP consists of components from both the public and private 
sectors. Thus, in this paper, although GDP is dealt with as a policy almost in the public sphere, it should be posed as a different type of sphere 
such as a gross socioeconomic sphere, which is of course directly linked to sociotropic economic voting.
22 Estévez-Abe (2008), pointed out some commonalities and differences of Japan with Scandinavian countries. While the Japanese government 
spends much more public works compared among developed countries and the amount ranks with Scandinavian countries, public works employ-
ment mainly depend on public sector funds in Japan, not private companies as in Scandinavian countries. This means that “public works projects 
channel money primarily to construction and related firms, which pay the wages of otherwise unemployed workers,” as opposed to public money 
directly delivered to workers (Estévez-Abe 2008, 34). Public works in Japan do not employ direct transfers, such as the comparatively expensive 
cases of agriculture and local subsidies, but instead act as job creation, and the increase of public works is equivalent to the direct payment of 
workers.
Table 2: Data Example of Each Quarter 
in 2000: Public Investments
quarter Cabinet Approcal
Public 
Investment
Accountability 
Pub.Inv.
2000q1 35.9 -6.6 -6.825
2000q2 27.3 0.6 0.475
2000q3 21 -2.4 -2.625
2000q4 19.3 -3.8 -4.025
⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞
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and implementation can deteriorate approval in 
some cases, as when a government implements a 
proposed tax increase. Moreover, economic shocks 
are predicted to evoke varied political responses 
and vice versa. As stated in Brandt & Freeman 
(2009, 114): “there is some popular accountability 
for economic policy and thus endogeneity between 
popular evaluations of the economy and macroeco-
nomic outcomes (or policies).” Reflecting the reality 
as well, empirical analyses should introduce esti-
mations enabling the computation of nested macro-
political dynamics.
Responding to this need, a Bayesian Structural 
Vector Autoregressive (B-SVAR) model will be 
introduced in the first empirical analysis in order to 
comprehensively grasp the partial simultaneity of the 
politico-economic system, with shrinking the esti-
mations of a number of parameters with respective 
to lags. Introducing an impulse-response function 
(IRF) lets us know the direction of economic and 
accountability shocks on political outcomes(Brandt 
& Freeman 2006, 2009, Sims & Zha 1998, 1999). 
The detailed setting of B-SVAR model is described 
in Appendix A.
Furthermore,the nuanced transition between 
economic and accountability voting in retrospection 
should be made to reflect estimations and not limited 
to a simultaneous relationship. Hence, the second 
empirical analysis will compute a historical decom-
position (HDC) for the movement of cabinet approval 
ratings based on the B-SVAR estimation results23. 
Besides checking multivariate shocks, IRF responses, 
and the shocks’ contributions to variances, an HDC 
can yield results of each variable’s contribution (public 
works spending, government expenditures, GDP) 
for the variable in question (approval ratings), which 
change over time. The HDC shares its foundation 
with the IRF, identifying which shock most reli-
ably impacts the structural innovation of the versant 
variable. By using an HDC, the volatility of cabinet 
approval ratings can be decomposed into individual 
structural innovations of cabinet approvals and each 
component’s shock.
Frequently, an HDC is applied to calculate the 
decomposition of the GDP contribution ratio. In 
order to compute the simple GDP contribution ratio, 
contribution ratios of all factors such as private and 
government final consumption expenditures, private 
and public fixed- capital formations, and private and 
public stock increases are identified with such as 
 (the case of private final consumption 𝐶𝑡 ). A 
decomposition of the contribution ratio is the most 
powerful method, but it is postulated that the GDP 
is equal to the summation of all elements. Further, 
the simple decomposition of contributions cannot 
capture each variable shock’s contributions. In this 
analysis, based on an SVAR setting, the main aim is 
the decomposition of the cabinet approval’s motion 
by each variable’s shock. Thus, an HDC is used 
rather than simple decomposition in formulating 
contributions. An HDC is expected to offer very 
nuanced transitions of the contributions of economic 
and accountability voting on cabinet approval vola-
tility. Further information on the HDC’s setting is 
explained in Appendix B.
4 Empirical Analyses
4.1  The Case of Public Works
Based on the above settings, the estimated IRFs are 
shown in Figure 124. These are IRFs among cabinet 
approvals, percentage changes from previous quar-
ters of public works, and accountability relating to 
public works ([the actual percentage change of public 
investments(t)]-[the proposed percentage change of 
public investment in EPBS (t-1)]). Error bands are 
set at 10%, and each upper and lower level as 5%. 
According to the cell in the first row and the second 
column in Figure 1, the public investment IRF of one 
point of standard deviation shock is likely to lead to 
an approximate 0.10% rise in the cabinet approval’s 
rating response two quarters (half a year) later. Simi-
larly, almost the same response can be enumerated 
from the shock of accountability relating to public 
investments; i.e., the positive deviation from the 
government proposed value. As pointed out in the 
literature on Japanese politics, citizens seem to prefer 
an increase of public works, which is regarded as the 
quid pro quo of social welfare.
Further, in order to decompose each structural 
shock’s contribution to the volatility of cabinet 
approval, which varies over different periods, the 
HDC’s result with respect to public investment is 
23 For HDC, see, Burbidge & Harrison (1985), Fackler & Parker (1994), Ocampo & Rodríguez (2012), and Doan (2010).
24 The calculation of B-SVAR models and their IRFs are conducted by “MSBVAR” package in R 3.0.1.
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reported in Figure 225. Black bars represent the actual 
public works’ contribution, i.e., economic voting, 
blue bars represent accountability and the green line 
represents the cabinet approval rating (percentage). 
Within the range of a quarterly period, black and blue 
bars are positioned in parallel and the relative contri-
bution can be interpreted according to the length of 
each bar. For instance, in the last period, the first 
quarter of 2013, the black bar– i.e., the public works 
shock’s contribution–indicates a contribution ratio 
on cabinet approval of about +6%, while the blue 
bar–i.e., accountability respective to public invest-
ment–is about -7.5. An interesting transition can be 
extrapolated according to this interpretation: at least 
during the 1980s, public investments per se (economic 
voting) is likely to predominate over accountability 
voting on public investments. Particularly from 1983 
to 1988, the contributions of economic voting are 
exemplified through public investments (black bars) 
that correspond to cabinet approval. Against this, 
after 1993-94, it can be seen that accountability bars 
become increasingly accentuated and contributions 
of accountability of public investment (blue bars) are 
more in tandem with approval behavior, with a few 
exceptions during the period of 1999-2001. Clearly, 
when focusing on public investment, the decomposi-
tion of cabinet approval with economic and account-
ability voting reveals the importance of Japanese 
political context: after the electoral institutional 
reform in 1993- 94, accountability, i.e. the differ-
ence between what the government says and what 
the government does, makes larger contributions to 
retrospective voting.
25 HDC were computed by RATS 8.30. Scripts for computations are available upon request.
Figure 1: B-SVAR: IRF of Public Works Model
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4.2  The case of government expenditure
In contrast with the public works model, almost 
opposite IRFs are confirmed in the government 
expenditure model. In the very initial period–e.g., 
a quarter (three months) later–a one-point increase 
in the standard deviation of the government expen-
diture’s shock leads to responses of a rise in cabinet 
approval by about 0.025%. But, after two quarters, it 
decreases to -0.05% and remains constant. Regarding 
accountability of government expenditure, almost 
same result can be found: an ascension of IRF 
appears about a quarter later. If the government tries 
to match what it proposes with what it supplies, it 
does not merely cause a reduction of public support 
but may cause an immediate rise in support. This 
IRF result also corroborates longstanding knowledge 
about Japanese politics: fiscal discipline is seen as 
the most important issues of political economy in 
Japan. Since the mid-1960s, the question of whether 
the Japanese government should issue construction 
bonds and to whom it should issue has been disputed. 
Because the issuance of bonds is prohibited by the 
Financial Acts in principle, citizens are disinclined 
to accept the issuance of bonds, and the Japanese 
government has long been cautious about finance 
debt. By the end of the 1990s, financial balance had 
become seriously deteriorated and citizens realized 
this. As the debt increased, an increase in govern-
ment expenditure per se was regarded as a dete-
rioration of fiscal discipline, and thought to evoke 
disapproval (Fujimura 2009). This theoretical rela-
tionship between debt issuance and approval ratings 
is backed by the IRF result in Figure 3
Interestingly, as shown in Figure 4, the HDC 
shows a different tendency from the public invest-
ment model: accountability voting (blue bars) 
seems to predominate during almost all periods. 
This result likely fits the abovementioned context 
of Japan. Japanese voters have been apt to sanction 
the expansion of expenditures. The correspondence 
between accountability and cabinet approval ratings 
means rises in ratings are affected by an increase in 
accountability and falls in ratings by a decrease in 
it. Thus, in regard to government expenditures as a 
whole, rewards and punishments for the Japanese 
government have been clearly inf luenced by the 
aspect of accountability, depending on the extent 
to which the government promises to spend what it 
actually spends. “Talk the talk and walk the walk” 
seems to be mostly observed in the case of govern-
ment expenditure.
Figure 2: HDC of cabinet approval with Public Works and accountability
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Figure 3: B-SVAR: IRF of Government Expenditure Model
Figure 4: HDC of cabinet approval with Government Expenditure and accountability
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4.3  The case of GDP
Finally, as shown in Figure 5, the actual GDP shock 
forces approval ratings up immediately after the 
shock, but accountability relating to GDP seems not 
to. GDP has long functioned as the typical operation-
alization and measurement of sociotropic economic 
voting. However, GDP per se does not directly 
embody what government implements for citizens. 
GDP is the product of comprehensive public and 
private economic activities. Hence, if emphasizing 
the aspect of what voters can obtain as an economic 
benefit from government distributions, the index 
of GDP is posed as the indirect operationaliza-
tion benefit rather than a direct benefit of economic 
voting. In Figure 5, the actual GDP shock seems to 
reflect this indirect property and the original GDP 
shock does not bring about a continuing response of 
cabinet approval rating. However, the periods sand-
wiched between the significant intervals remain for 
two quarters and show positive signs. This indicates 
that socio-tropic economic voting relating to GDP is 
confirmed, albeit for only a short time.
In Figure 6, the contribution of accountability 
shocks is ascendant over the actual GDP shock from 
the initial periods to all periods. However, marginal 
effects are zigzagged around the zero line. These 
results are controversial and the impulse-response 
relationship between accountability on GDP and 
approval ratings seem limited, although account-
ability makes up a large part of the residuals relating 
to cabinet approval ratings.
Figure 5: B-SVAR: IRF of GDP Model
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After organizing the relationships between each 
of the economic and accountability shocks and 
cabinet approvals, interpretations for IRFs–i.e., other 
shocks and responses–should be organized. The most 
obvious observation is that cabinet approval shocks 
do not evoke any significant response of public 
investments, government expenditures, or GDP, nor 
do the respective accountability shocks.
For other impulses and responses, the same holds 
for all three types of models, and accountability 
shocks reduce economic indicators themselves. In 
contrast, when the economy per se rises, account-
ability is likely to rise as well. For example, in the 
cell in the second row and third column of Figure 
1, a shock from accountability respective to public 
investment causes a negative response of public 
investment from -2 to -4%. In contrast, in the same 
Figure 1, the cell in the third row and second column, 
the shock from accountability causes about a 2% rise 
in public investment.
What causes this contrast? It seemingly occurs 
due to coordination by the government. When a posi-
tive deviation from the proposed values in EPBS 
become large, this indicates that the government 
supplies more public investment and this places 
downward pressure on additional expenses for public 
works. When the economy is booming, in regard to 
the economic impulse on accountability’s response, 
the proposed values in EPBS should increase and 
naturally cause more deviation between the proposed 
and actual values. As a result, the cell in the second 
row and third column shows a positive marginal 
response. The same interpretations can be applied to 
the results in Figure 3 and 5.
5 Discussions and Conclusions: Interpreting 
Empirical Results in the Context of Japan
This research has performed an analysis of nuanced 
f luctuant change between economic and account-
ability voting behaviors. In the empirics of retrospec-
tive voting, economic voting is considered as the 
core by most voters, but those who scrutinize the 
correspondence between what government prom-
ises and what it actually implements might lean 
toward accountability voting. In order to analyze 
the nuanced, critical, and policydimensional transi-
tions between economic and accountability voting 
in developed countries, the author has highlighted 
Japan’s postwar politics. An electoral institutional 
change in Japan was presumed to yield implica-
tions for retrospective voting: a critical change from 
economic voting to accountability voting. For inves-
tigating the differences along the policy dimension, 
the author chooses three aspects of policy sphere: 
public works referring to private goods sphere, and 
government expenditure and GDP regarded as in 
public goods sphere. Using a B-SVAR model and 
Figure 6: HDC of cabinet approval with GDP and accountability
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HDC, nuanced voters’ transitions between economic/
accountability voting were confirmed in some anal-
yses.
Based on a theoretical perspective of the elec-
toral institutional change that occurred in 1993-94 in 
Japanese politics, a readily apprehensible and analyz-
able change of economic voting and accountability 
voting was presumed to have occurred. Regarding 
the public works, as Figure 2 of the HDC analysis 
shows, this change was relatively corroborated. But 
the other two analyses–government expenditures and 
GDP analyses–do show emphatic contributions from 
accountability voting. As previously mentioned, 
public investment has functioned as a substitute 
policy for social welfare (Estévez-Abe 2008, Miura 
2012, Kitayama 2003, Kohno & Nishizawa 1990). 
Public works in Japan have functioned as an arche-
typal targeted private goods for voters. As the elec-
toral institutional reform was intended to ameliorate 
the process by which pork is distributed, the graded 
transition between economic and accountability 
voting was expected to clearly change after the 
reform in the area of public works. Our positive 
finding can be posed as corroborating previous 
empirical evidence that private goods have more 
appeal to voters (e.g. McCubbins & Rosenbluth 1995, 
Saito 2010, Tatebayashi 2004). Direct deliberation of 
how goods are distributed seems to affect retrospec-
tive voting more as a whole, regardless of whether 
economic or accountability voting is predominant.
As discussed in Section 4.2, however, entire 
government expenditures seem to call for account-
ability retrospection, not economic retrospection. 
In actuality, general expenditure policy embraces 
expenditures for social welfare that are partially 
regarded as private goods, thus an increase is thought 
to make approval ratings rise. Because Japanese 
voters have been disinclined to see a financial expan-
sion, the aim of government expenditures is not to 
too much increase government expenditures. Further, 
regarding the HDC analysis, the accountability-
related contribution is clearer than the contribution 
of expenditures. When a deviation from the prospec-
tive value is sufficiently small, voters reward the 
government and when it is large, they sanction the 
government. In regard to economic growth, the same 
tendency with government expenditures can be found 
in the HDC analysis.
In sum, in the case of public works, the predomi-
nance of economic voting seems to change sharply 
to accountability voting after the 1994 reform. But in 
other cases, clear-cut transitions before and after the 
reform do not appear and contributions of account-
ability remain constant. Since nuanced transitions 
are positively confirmed in one case–public works, 
but not in the other two cases, the change after insti-
tutional reform is not necessarily accentuated.
Why does the difference occur in public invest-
ments and other economic aspects? The key is 
thought to be the degree in which economic indica-
tors are related to the economic climate. In Japan, 
major industrial groups such as the Japan Federation 
of Economic Organizations, the Japan Association 
of Corporate Executives and the Japan Federation 
of Employers’ Associations promoted the need for 
public works projects as pump-priming measures 
and the LDP government responded vigorously, 
mainly with an eye to electoral outcomes. Public 
works, hence, has been closely linked to economic 
trends through the rise of employment (Miura 2012, 
Estévez-Abe 2008, Chaps. 8-9). Specifically focusing 
on the period from 1993 to 2000, the main trend 
relates to regulatory reform and small government 
orientation, and promotes the shrinkage of public 
investments. However, there is an opposing trend 
that is affected by political pressure from the above 
economic groups, and brings about the expansion of 
public works. The wild fluctuation of public works 
expenditures is likely to reflect fierce clashes between 
these two trends. Sometimes the shrinkage of public 
works deviates less from promised values as a mani-
festation of accountability voting is highly evaluated, 
while in other times, the expansion of public works 
causing higher employment and an economic boost 
is more favored. In the former period, retrospective 
voting is expected to tend toward accountability 
voting and in the latter, toward economic voting. In 
fields heavily tinged by the economic climate through 
the amount of private goods such as public works, 
accountability retrospection tends to elapse, and 
economic voting seems activate. This in turn causes 
the nuanced change between economic/account-
ability voting to vary at different time periods.
The impulse of whole government expenditure 
on the response of approval, however, is not quite as 
simple as in the case of public works. While govern-
ment expenditure as a whole is not necessarily linked 
to the rise and fall of economic boom per se, an 
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increase in social welfare fulfills aspects of govern-
ment expenditure that necessarily raise (corporate, 
income, consumption) tax rates, and can squeeze the 
private sector. As mentioned previously, an increase 
in government expenditure tends to be regarded as an 
erosion of fiscal discipline and conjures up the possi-
bility of tax increases and then recession. In the case 
of government expenditure as a whole with respect to 
corporate income tax, influence from the economic 
groups that are sensitive to economic trends moti-
vates the government to retrench expenditures and 
behave accountably. Voter behaviors are supposed 
to reflect accountability in response to government 
expenditure. Further, this simultaneously indicates 
that accountability voting as highly sophisticated 
retrospective voting is likely to predominate in 
matters of economic indicators including the public 
goods sector. In addition, along the line of classifica-
tions, “talk-the-talk”/“walk-the-walk” politics (as 
explained in section 3.1) is highly evaluated in the 
public goods sphere. In contrast, in the private goods 
sphere, just “walk-the-walk politics” seems more 
desirable to voters. However, importantly, even in 
the private goods sphere, the electoral institutional 
change intended to transform resource distribution 
did alter voters’ retrospections from economic voting 
to accountability voting as shown in Figure 2 of 
public works case.
While this research considered endogeneity 
deeply and t r ies to account for it through the 
B-SVAR model, the endogeneity problem still 
remains. First, endogeneity in the measurement of 
economic and accountability indexes remains. The 
degree of accountability is computed as [the realized 
value of economic indicators]- [the proposed value 
of economic indicators in EPBS]. The realized value 
per se is set as the economic voting’s index, hence, 
the [β1𝑥economic + β2𝑥accountability] can be decomposed 
into [β1𝑥economic + β2𝑥economic − β2𝑥accountability]. In 
this research, this possible bias has not been consid-
ered so that the pure impulse of accountability 
may not be understood. The accountability index 
should be conceptually defined as the deviation of 
the observed value from the government’s prom-
ised value. Thus, the endogeniety stemming from 
the measurement should inevitably remain and be 
treated as the decomposed impulse of both economic 
and accountability indexes. Second, this research 
focused on government expenditures and emphasized 
the importance of fiscal discipline. However, the 
government deficit shock on retrospective voting is 
also believed to be a prominent factor. Based on the 
present operationalization of accountability, which is 
defined as the difference between promise and imple-
mentation, the proposed (promised) values of deficits 
cannot be set due to the limitation of the employed 
data. Thus, in order to compute the IRF and HDC 
between the deficitrelated- accountability and cabinet 
approval rating, other research designs should be 
employed. Large deficits compared with other devel-
oped countries have now become a core issue in the 
Japanese political economy. Deficit shocks on retro-
spection, thus, should be analyzed in future research 
with a new, well-considered study design.
A  The Bayesian Structural Vector 
Autoregressive Model
In this research, the estimating SVAR model setting 
with three-dimensional multivariate time-series 
model is as follows;
 (1)
Eq. (1) is the structural form of SVAR. Note that 𝑦𝑡 
=(𝑦cabinet,t , 𝑦econ,t , 𝑦account,t)′means the 3 × 1 stacked 
row vector: cabinet approval, economic indicator 
(e.g. GDP, public investments, or government expen-
ditures) , and its respective accountability. 𝐵0 repre-
sents the 3 × 3 matrix of simultaneous effects, which 
diagonal components are 1. 𝑐 is the 3 × 1 vector of the 
constant term and 𝐵1, 𝐵2, 𝐵3 are 3 × 3 of the coeffi-
cient matrix of each lag. Regarding structural distur-
bance terms, 𝜇t follows white noise with covariance 
matrix Σ. It also signifies normal structural shocks. 
Restricting identifications on some parameters of 𝐵0, 
for example, the first line of equation in Eq. (1) can 
be set as the one for cabinet approval rating. For this 
set, 𝜇1t directly means a deviation from an expected 
approval ratings attributed to economic and account-
ability shocks. The structural form of SVAR cannot 
be solved in this form, because a simultaneous equa-
tion embraces the bias, so it must be transformed 
into the reduced form with lagged components. The 
reduced form of SVAR can be represented as;
 (2)
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Note that 𝜙𝑖 represents 𝐵
−1𝐵𝑙 , and 𝜀𝑡 = 𝐵
−1𝜇t , 
whereVar(𝜀t = 𝐵
−1Σ𝐵−1)). In order to recover the 
structural parameters relating to 𝐵0, 3(3−1)/2 = 3 
restricting elements set as zero are imposed. For the 
Bayesian estimation of SVAR, first, let Eq. (1) take 
the compact form as follows;
 (3)
where 𝑌 is the 𝑇 × 𝑚 matrix of 𝑦′t = [𝑦′1t , 𝑦′2t , 𝑦′3t , 
1], 𝐴′0 = [𝐴1t , 𝐴2t , 𝐴3𝑡 , 𝐴ct ] is the 𝑚 × 𝑚 contempo-
raneous coefficients matrix, 𝑋 denotes the 𝑇 × (𝑚𝑝+1) 
(where 𝑝 denotes the number of lags) stacked matrix 
of lagged components 𝑥′t−1 = [𝑦′𝑡−1 , 𝑦′𝑡−2 , 𝑦′𝑡−3 , 
1], Φ′ = [𝜙𝑡−1 , 𝜙𝑡−2 , 𝜙𝑡−3 , 𝜙c ] is the 𝑇 × (𝑚𝑝+1) of 
lagged coefficients, and 𝐸 finally is the 𝑇 × 𝑚 matrix 
of error terms. Conditioned with 𝐴0, the likelihood 
function becomes;
 (4)
According to Sims and Zha (1998), the prior 
belief for 𝐴 conditioned with the specification of 𝐴0 
can be represented as the probability density func-
tion 𝜋(â);
 (5)
where 𝑎0 (𝑎) denotes the vectorized 𝐴0 (𝐴), and 
𝜙(⋅;Σ) is a multivariate normal distribution, with 
mean ã and covariance Σ. This prior belief is the 
improved Minnesota prior and the form of Σ  is set as 
the standard deviation of each coefficient such that
 (6)
All notations are appeared in Table 3 and the 
detailed explanation in Brandt & Freeman (2006, 
13-14), Brandt & Freeman (2009, 119-120, 124, 
131-132)and Sims & Zha (1998). In order to estimate 
the frequentist reduced form VAR (RF-VAR) model, 
there are many parameters relating to the number of 
variables (𝑚, orders of lags (𝑝), and error covariance 
matrix (Σ). Thus, to reduce the number of param-
eters to be estimated, the hyper parameters for the 
standard deviation of AR(1), lag decay, intercept, 
and exogenous variable coefficients are set as the 
following equation and shown in Table 3 .
The identifying restrictions are non-recursive 
and set as in Table 326. Further, dummy variables 
representing a year of the Upper and Lower House 
elections as well as consumer price index (CPI) and 
unemployment rates are set as exogenous variables.
With the above set t ing of the pr ior belief, 
combining the likelihood function Eq.(4) and (5) 
posterior density for coefficients, 𝑞(𝐴) is drawn with
 (7)
Regarding merits embracing in the posterior density 
based on the Minnesota prior distribution, the detailed 
explanation can be found in Brandt & Freeman (2006, 
12-13) and Sims & Zha (1999, 1116-1120).
Then, impulses (innovations or shocks) of the 𝑘th 
variable to the response of the 𝑗th interested variable 
at the 𝑠 period can be represented as the marginal 
effect via the residual vector of ε𝑡 = (ε1𝑡 , ε2𝑡 , ⋯ , ε𝐾𝑡 ),
26 The most notable is cabinet approval’s shock on the response of accountability index. As implied by, for example, Evans & Pickup (2010), govern-
ment support is theoretically expected to inversely influence on the perception of economy. Taking such a potential path into considerations, the 
identifying restrictions forms in non-recursive as in Table 4.
Table 3: The values of hyperparameter
Hyperpa-
rameter Values
λ0 Overall scale of the error covariance matrix 0.5
λ1 Standard deviation about 𝐴1 (persistence) 0.5
𝑙 Lag decay 4
λ4 Scale of standard deviation of intercept 0.25
λ5
Scale of standard deviation of exogenous  
variables coefficients 0.07
𝜇5 Sum of autoregressive coefficients component 2
𝜇6 Dummy initial observations component 5
Note: Brandt & Freeman (2009), see also, Sims & Zha (1998).
Table 4: Identifying Restrictions
Response/Shock cabinet approval
economic 
index
account-
ability index
cabinet approval X X X
economic index(Pub.
Invest/Gov.Exp./GDP) 0 0 0
accountability index X 0 0
Note: “X” means a contemporaneous relationship, “0” refers to zero 
restriction otherwise.
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 (8)
Then, in order to set the coefficient matrices Ψ𝑗, we use
 (9)
  (10)
where 𝐿 means the lag operator and 𝐴(𝐿) denotes 
the matrix of lag polinomial of (𝐴0+𝐴1𝐿+𝐴2𝐿
2+ ⋯ + 
𝐴𝑝𝐿
𝑝). Ψ𝑗𝑘 coefficient is generally known as conve-
nient representation of the inverted VAR representa-
tion 𝐴(𝐿)−1. Introducing 𝐾 × 𝐾 coefficient matrices Ψ𝑗,
 (11)
then substituting Eq. (11) in (10) and organizing it, 
the following IRF can be obtained;
 (12)
B  Historical Decomposition
Based on the Eq. (12) omitting the deterministic 
elements, the 𝑘th (𝑘 = 1, ⋯ ,𝐾) variables structural 
shock (non-forecastable component of 𝑦𝑡 ), η𝑡 , on 𝑗th 
variable is written as27
 (14)
where structural shocks η are not directly feasible. 
Therefore, as in Equation (11) and (12), the residuals 
from the SVAR estimations, η, is defined as follows:
 (15)
Following Eq. (1), (12), (14), and (15) the multi-
variate time-series 𝑦𝑡 can be rewritten as ;
 (16)
   (17)
where Ψ𝑖 denotes the MA coeff icient matrices. 
Now, suppose 𝐅 is given by 𝐅 = 𝑦𝑡 − ȳ
(𝑘) 𝑗𝑡  = 𝑓𝑡 (𝑦0, 
⋯ , 𝑦1−𝑝), and refers to the effects of the accumula-
tion of all shocks before each sample. A structural 
shock that occurred in the period that has long 
passed gradually decays as 𝑓 (𝑦0, ⋯ , 𝑦1−𝑝) →0 
and 𝐅 → 𝜇𝑡 , when 𝑡 is sufficiently large. With the 
above setting, the HDC is given by;
 (18)
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